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Abstract 
The lengthy and convoluted process leading to the 2008 Reauthorization of the Higher 
Education Act can be explained using John Kingdon's policy process model in which policy 
problems, possible solutions, and political alignments can converge to open a "window" 
through which policy entrepreneurs can advance their preferred positions.  In the case of 
HEA'08, the problems stream was created by complaints about rising costs and higher 
education performance.  The policy stream was propelled by the popularity of national 
movement toward standards-based regulation and accountability in K-12 education.   The 
politics stream, composed of reform-minded Republican Congressional and Presidential 
leadership uncommitted to traditional higher education and a divided higher education 
advocacy coalition, was complicated by heightened partisanship and legislative paralysis.  The 
resulting pressure successfully opened a policy window through which Republican policy 
entrepreneurs pursued ambitious accountability-focused regulatory reforms aimed at higher 
education.  Although slowed by Democratic victories in 2006 and the eventual mobilization of 
the traditional higher education community, the idea of greater accountability captured enough 
momentum to move the focus of HEA’08 away from access and autonomy toward greater 
regulation and intervention. (Note: This paper is a significant revision of a presentation given at 

















The 2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA’08) took six years, 14 
extensions, four Congresses, three shifts in partisan majorities, and parts of two budget 
reconciliation bills, culminating in a 1,158-page “Higher  Education Opportunity Act” (HEOA) 
signed by President George W. Bush in August 2008.  Many long-time HEA reauthorization 
participants interviewed for this analysis1 believed that in addition to taking longer, HEA’08 was 
“more partisan” than previous reauthorization cycles, focused on “cost over access,” was 
fragmented by budget reconciliation, and was compromised by a “broken” Congress.  One 
observer facetiously compared the process to a bad Russian novel: “long, boring, and everyone 
dies.”  Some participants felt the results were “the most significant since 1992,” expanding 
access to need-based grants, making loans cheaper and easier to repay, and broadening 
institutional eligibility in exchange for a few more enrollment reports.  Others complained that 
in the end “nothing really changed,” the process “involved the same people making the same 
speeches on the same issues,” producing only incremental improvements in access at the price 
                                                     
1 Although the Purdue University IRB determined that the protocol (#0810007440) describing 
this research was in the exempt category because of the public nature of the material, 
interviewees were informed that direct quotes would not be attributed or other identifying 
information would be used in any published or presented analysis. 
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of “gimmicky” regulatory efforts while diminishing the original intent of “helping poor kids go to 
college.”  Many, however, were concerned that HEA’08 recast the federal role in higher 
education “from partner to threat” and more than one saw the resurgent role of the 
Department of Education (DOE) and the enhanced Congressional interest in oversight as a step 
toward a federal system of higher education.   
What really happened in HEA’08, and more importantly, why?  Understanding HEA’08 is 
important because the Higher Education Act authorizes nearly three-quarters of all student 
financial aid in American colleges and universities, with consequent impact on enrollments, 
operations, mission, and indeed the very existence of American higher education (The College 
Board, 2011).  If, as many claimed, the policy result of HEA’08 was to accelerate the shift in 
federal higher education policy away from its traditional focus on expanding access and 
institutional autonomy toward a new interventionist focus on assuring institutional 
accountability through increased regulation, understanding the how and why is essential to 
understanding the future of American higher education (American Council on Education, 2008; 
Conner & Rabovsky, 2011).  
Policy process scholars posit that policy outcomes are the consequence of a particular 
alignment of political demands, policy options, actor resources, and institutional dynamics 
(Easton, 1964; Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993; Ripley & Franklin, 1991; Sabatier, 1999).  I will 
argue here that in the case of HEA’08, these forces converged to create what John Kingdon 
(2003) called a “policy window” through which politically powerful “policy entrepreneurs,” as 
he called them, could advance their preferred policy positions (p. 86).   Refining Michael D. 
Cohen, James G. March, & Johan P. Olsen’s “garbage can” model of the policy process, Kingdon 
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proposed that on the either random or prodded occasion that “problem streams” generated by 
the environment raise issues to the public agenda, align with existing and proposed “policy 
solution streams,” and are supported by the necessary “politics streams” (e.g., public organized 
interests, experts, elections, partisan forces, and office holders), a “policy window”  structured 
by institutional decision-making rules opens through which policy entrepreneurs can push the 
now publicly and politically supported solution through to adoption (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 86-89).   
During HEA’08, problems such as rising expectations for higher education, cost 
concerns, and questions about higher education operations achieved public agenda status in 
part because these issues aligned with the standards-based regulation and accountability 
policies that had the political support of Republican office-holders in the White House, the 
executive branch, and Congress.  Republican policy entrepreneurs, none of whom my informers 
pointed out were “elected on an higher education agenda,” capitalized on their majority 
position in a highly partisan environment, exploiting the relative weakness of a higher 
education advocacy coalition in transition and higher education’s “legitimacy paradox” in the 
eyes of the public to propose ambitious regulatory reforms that challenged the tradition of 
institutional autonomy in American higher education.  Although stymied when their political 
support declined after the Democratic victories in 2006, reformers had captured enough 
momentum to move the focus in federal-higher education relations from access and 
affordability toward greater accountability and regulation by the time the HEA reauthorization 
process was completed in August 2008.   
From Kingdon’s (2003) perspective, the “streams” that converged in HEA’08 had been 
flowing for some time.  HEA’s original redistributive goals to help low- and moderate-income 
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students go to college had become more distributive over time as the increasing participation 
and salience of higher education prompted liberal needs-based grant eligibility when political 
(Democratic) alignments permitted (1970s), and the introduction and expansion of loans for 
middle class students when broader (Republican) support was needed (1980s).  Expansion 
fueled enrollment and both federal and institutional costs, raising questions about outcomes 
(1990s).  By the time HEA’08 got underway, budget concerns limited options and prompted 
(Republican) calls for greater oversight and institutional accountability.  As informed observers 
noted at the time, the political and policy flow that led to HEA’08’s emphasis on accountability 
over access was and many believe will continue to be, entirely predictable (Johnstone, 1998; 
Spencer, 1999; Wolanin, 2003). 
Significance 
As of academic year 2010–2011, HEA authorized grant, loan, and tax benefit programs 
accounting for more than 74% of all student financial aid ($227.2 billion) at American colleges 
and universities, making the federal government the largest single source of student financial 
aid for college in the United States (The College Board, 2011).  Originally passed in 1965 as a 
weapon in the War on Poverty to “help poor kids go to college,” HEA has been reauthorized 
eight times2 over the last four decades, extending its reach, expanding its mission, and 
defining the relationship between the federal government and American higher education as 
it went (Cook, 1998; Gladieux & Wolanin, 1976; Hannah, 1996; Parsons, 1997).    
Table 1.   Total Student Aid by Source and Type (in Billions), 2010-2011 
                                                     
2 In 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, and 2008. 
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Program Amount Percentage 
Federal loans $104.0 45.8 
Pell Grants $34.8 15.3 
Education Tax Credits and Deductions $14.8 6.5 
Federal Work Study $1.2 0.5 
Other Federal Grant Programs $14.3 6.3 
Total HEA-authorized aid programs $169.1 74.4 
State Grants $9.2 4.1 
Institutional Grants $38.1 16.8 
Private and Employers Grants $10.8 4.8 
Total $227.2 100 
Note. Components may not sum to 100% due to rounding (The College Board, 2011). 
 
Table 1 demonstrates the dominance of HEA-authorized programs, especially by federally 
subsidized loans (45.8%), as sources of student financial aid.  Institutional grants (16.8%) are the 
next largest aid source.  Altogether, HEA accounted for $169.1 billion (74.4%) in student aid in 
2010–2011, supporting 16.3 million students at more than 7,000 eligible postsecondary 
institutions in the U.S. and abroad (National Center for Education Statistics, 2010; The College 
Board, 2011).  HEA’s role in financing American higher education is only likely to grow as state 
allocations to higher education continue to decline and the proportion of revenue from tuition 
continues to increase (The College Board, 2011).  
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Explaining HEA’08 
The following analysis draws on John Kingdon’s (2003) “policy window” model of the 
policy process to review the environmental, issue, actor, and institutional streams that 
converged to produce HEA’08.   Appendix A presents a timeline that highlights major HEA 
actions and reactions by Congress and the higher education community; HEA-related hearings 
are noted as illustrative of key issues and debates.  Additional resources include the complex 
legislative record; extensive primary materials provided by participating individuals and 
organizations; published press, expert, and academic analysis; and personal interviews with 
individuals who were directly involved in more than one reauthorization cycle.  
Timeline  
As had the previous reauthorizations, HEA’08 began on schedule in the fall of 2002, two 
years before the previous reauthorization was to expire in 2004.  The relevant House and 
Senate committees usually invite public recommendations in late fall, hold hearings during the 
spring and summer, draft legislation and hold mark-up sessions over the fall and winter, move 
through committee, floor, and conference debates and final votes in the spring, and send an 
approved bill to the president by summer.  In the case of HEA’08, however, nothing proceeded 
as expected. 
Environmental demands.  As theory would suggest (Dye, 1966; Easton, 1957), HEA’08 
participants began their reflections by commenting on the social, economic, and political 
conditions they believed played a significant role in shaping the process and its outcome.   The 
most frequently cited factors included: 
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The growing importance of higher education.  By the time the call for reauthorization 
recommendations went out in the fall of 2002, preparing America for the Information Age 
through education was a priority issue from kitchen tables to local school boards to Congress.  
In a flattening world where jobs could go anywhere, the global race to the top had been 
redefined as about producing the most educated and innovative workforce, making higher 
education a national as well as a personal imperative (Friedman, 2005).  While higher education 
had shifted its focus through the millennia to adjust to social and political demands (Scott, 
2006), this new responsibility for national and human well-being opened what once was a quiet 
intellectual enterprise affecting relatively few to a critically important national strategy (Ewell, 
2008).   
Higher education’s “legitimacy paradox.”  Trends in public attitudes toward higher 
education pointed to a growing “legitimacy paradox” in which college degrees were seen as 
essential for career success, but the institutions themselves were at once respected and viewed 
with suspicion (Ewell, 2008; Spencer, 1999).  A 2009 poll by the National Center for Public Policy 
and Higher Education, for example, found that 87% of Americans felt that high school seniors 
will have better job prospects if they go on to college (Immerwahr & Johnson, 2009).   At the 
same time, the majority of Americans worried that college costs were rising so fast that many 
qualified students could not attend, that colleges could cut costs and retain quality, and that 
colleges focus too much on non-academic issues (Immerwahr & Johnson, 2009).  An American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) poll also found  core higher education values under 
challenge, with only qualified public support for tenure and academic freedom and growing 
support for firing “radical” faculty and countering “liberal bias” (Curtis, 2006).  Concurrently, 
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broad public dissatisfaction with the performance of K–12 education paved the way for equally 
broad public acceptance of federal intervention (Lowry, 2009).  The tensions created by the 
public belief in the quality and purpose of higher education and yet resentment about rising 
costs, privileged status, and institutional operations provided a backdrop of mixed public 
messages for policy-makers throughout reauthorization. 
College enrollment/graduation trends.  The great variation in the needs, interests, and 
success of an increasingly diverse a population of students and institutions created another 
cluster of conflicting demands.  By the time HEA’08 was finalized, DOE reported that 66% of 
high school students planned to go to college, and a diverse cadre of 17.5 million students were 
already enrolled in a 4,314 public, private, and for-profit, two-year and four-year, degree-
granting institutions scattered across the county (NCES, 2008).  In this group, 86% were 
undergraduates; 62% were full-time; 57% were women; 37% were in two-year institutions; and 
32% were minority (National Center for Education Statistics, 2008; The Chronicle of Higher 
Education, 2008).  Some 75% were “nontraditional” in the sense that they were not a high 
school graduate or did not come to college directly from high school, or were attending part-
time and working full-time, or were financially independent, married, or had dependents 
(Wolanin, 2003).  Meanwhile the student population continued to shift from private (19%) to 
public (74%) and for-profit institutions (7%, up from 3% over the last decade).  During the same 
period, the student population aged and became more ethnically and racially diverse (The 
College Board, 2008).     
Federal and state budgets.  The fact that, as one participant noted, “the federal 
government is broke” meant that the “pay-go” rules (any program requiring new funding would 
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have to be balanced by cuts elsewhere) created a horse-trading environment for HEA’08.  The 
primary federal reallocation targets in HEA were the generous fees and subsidies paid to private 
lenders to induce their participation in loan programs.  Although there was bipartisan 
agreement that subsidies were too high, the debate was over where to reallocate the “savings.”  
State budgets were no refuge as K–12, Medicaid, and law enforcement spending grew and 
higher education’s share declined along with state revenues, a fact that resulted in state 
“maintenance of effort” in financing higher education becoming a major issue during HEA’08.   
The “college cost crises” and federal responsibility.  While competition for public dollars 
was not new to reauthorization, the rapidly rising cost of higher education created an 
unavoidable and consequential demand for government action in HEA’08.  Myriad reports 
issued during HEA’08 concluded that “over the last two de decades, the cost of attending two- 
and four-year public and private colleges … has grown more rapidly than inflation, and faster 
than family income as well” (National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, 2002, p. 5; 
Boehner & McKeon, 2003; National Center for Education Statistics, 2001; The College Board, 
2008).  Previously “cost” had been politically translated into “affordability” and ameliorated by 
incremental increases in Pell grants, dramatic expansion in loan options for middle-class 
students and families, and revolutionary tax credits through the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.    
The message that middle class families were “losing ground” in paying for college at the very 
moment college was becoming essential for economic well-being was a common complaint to 
congressmen across the country.  Two-thirds of people surveyed in an NEA poll taken prior to 
the 2008 presidential election believed that given the importance of a college education in 
making the U.S. competitive in the global economy, the federal government should play a 
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“substantial” role in making college more affordable  (National Education Association, 2008).   
Variations in cost by region and type of institution, uneven public–private enrollment 
distributions, and the complexity of college expenditures, however, made it difficult to 
determine what to do and for whom.   
 The New Politics, partisanship, and the permanent campaign.  Landing on the political 
“front burner,” noted one participant, moved higher education into the full political and highly 
partisan fray.  The traditionally bipartisan and “hands off” approach to higher education evident 
in earlier reauthorizations was abandoned as each party staked out claims for the education 
vote.  Exacerbating the partisan visibility, Congress changed partisan hands on narrow margins 
twice.  New interest groups and think tanks appeared on all sides.  Old and new actors alike 
took up “permanent campaign” methods of polling, focus groups, media strategies, grassroots 
constituency mobilization through technology, unified association messages from Washington 
D.C., and myriad reports and studies using “scientific” data to make their point (National 
Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, 2008; Spencer, 1999).  While neither the 
public nor many in Congress always saw higher education policy debate in partisan terms 
(Doyle, 2007; Parsons, 1997), the conflict between rising college costs and rising national and 
personal debt eventually forced everyone to choose sides. 
Climate for change.  Early in the reauthorization process, long-time HEA participants and 
observers Bruce Johnstone (1998) and Tom Wolanin (2003) predicted that for economic as well 
as political reasons, whatever policy shifts emerged were likely to be incremental and “more of 
the same” rather than dramatic redirection.  Johnstone, a higher education finance expert and 
previous DOE analyst, argued that “something so large, complex, and politically robust as higher 
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education finance…together with the enormous variation already in the system, both in the 
per-student expenses and in the sharing of these costs, plus the existence of powerful parties 
with stakes in the status quo—all make revolutionary change unlikely.”  He also believed that 
there were no credible alternatives to the current higher education finance system or to the 
structure of college and university operations likely to increase income or to control the cost 
(Johnstone, 1998, p. 253).  Wolanin, previous staff director for Representative Bill Ford (D-MI) 
who influenced HEA reauthorizations from 1965–1992, agreed with Johnstone’s assessment of 
the lack of an intellectual or political foundation for major change, adding that the higher public 
priority of K–12 education, a bare federal budget, and close partisan balances in Congress made 
significant policy change in any realm including higher education unlikely.  He noted, however, 
that the “fact that the HEA reauthorization is likely to be incremental does not mean that it will 
be unimportant,” especially to the millions of students and institutions affected by even small 
changes.  He also worried that incremental changes that narrow access or increase the 
regulatory burden could have a significant negative impact (Wolanin, 2003, pp. 2-4).  Many 
thoughtful observers believe that is exactly what happened.   
Policy Options.  Kingdon predicted that policy outcomes will also be affected by the 
nature of the policy options available to respond to demands arising from the larger 
environment (Kingdon, 2003).  Policy scholars have long noted that that options vary depending 
upon the policy type as defined by impact on society, i.e. who benefits—redistributive, 
distributive, or regulatory—each generating its own political dynamic or “power arena” (Hayes, 
2007; Lowi, 1972; Ripley & Franklin, 1991).  Such typologies can be subdivided depending upon 
the context, the relative strength of the executive, the activism of party and Congress, and the 
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presence of organized interests (Hayes, 2007).  Experience with a policy over time also can shift 
the ideas and orientations of participants as they learn to adjust to new realities and initially 
radical ideas become generally accepted expectations (Heclo, 1978; Weiss, 1977).  
Redistributive policies, for example, require strong a political consensus and inevitably become 
more distributive to gain support, evolving toward regulation as government investment grows 
(Finkin, 1994). 
Not surprisingly, legislation that is as old and complex as HEA demonstrates all three 
policy-political patterns and subpatterns as well.  Redistributive policies such as the BEOG (Pell 
Grant) program foreshadowed in HEA’65, for example, benefit a few at the expense of the 
many and require a strong executive (such as LBJ) who can control Congress (which was solidly 
Democratic) and mobilize public support (via the War on Poverty).  As presidential interest and 
commitment weakened over time, Congress became more divided, and beneficiaries remained 
unevenly organized, support dissipated as did the focus of HEA.  Predictably, distributive loans 
expanded and redistributive grants contracted with each reauthorization as HEA supporters 
sought a broader constituency (Cook, 1998; Hannah, 1996; Parsons, 1997; Ripley & Franklin, 
1991).    
Theory predicts that the redistributive history and distributive present of HEA will evolve 
into a regulatory future.  The “access” theme of the 1960s and 1970s which had already 
broadened into “affordability” in the 1980s and 1990s became “accountability” with HEA’08.  
Regulatory theory holds that once government investment reaches a “tipping point,” self-
regulation such as the regional peer accreditation system in higher education cannot 
adequately reflect the public interest or justify continuously increasing federal investment 
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(Finkin, 1994; Finkin, 2009).  Congress then steps in and either establishes standards or 
delegates the task to administrative rule-making agencies, completing the transition to a 
regulatory “power arena.”  Old redistribution divides between a variety of haves and have-nots 
emerged in the HEA’08 debates on whether and how to increase Pell grants for needy students 
or expand income-based loan programs by reducing lender subsidies, but even these were 
impacted by questions about what taxpayers were getting for their money.  Clearly the 
pressure for greater regulation was building. 
Regulation as reform.  Concurrently, the Republican president and Congressional 
majorities advanced a publically popular regulatory reform agenda for K–12 education, itself a 
convergence of public concern, the growing popularity of standards-based education, and 
weakness in the traditional union—Democratic Party coalition.  It was therefore no surprise 
when the Republican president proposed a similar accountability effort for higher education, 
using both regulatory and legislative initiatives to challenge the traditional institutional 
autonomy of America’s Democratic-leaning higher education establishment.  The fact that 
Republican reform proposals for greater regulation ran counter to its more typical laissez-faire 
position was an irony not lost on participants at the time.  The lack of a core Republican focus 
on higher education—no Republican “ran on higher education” as one participant put it—also 
meant that reformers often responded to opposition with delay rather than force conflicts that 
might jeopardize higher party priorities. 
The predictability of regulation was assured by central focus of the Republican 
majorities who controlled the executive for all and Congress for most of the reauthorization 
process on how to slow the rising cost of higher education.  Since there was no new money for 
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increasing aid, the solution, so the argument went, was to control costs by closer scrutiny of 
how higher education institutions performed in order to hold them “accountable.”  When the 
Republican-led EWC issued its call for HEA reauthorization recommendations in September 
2002, traditional HEA access and affordability goals were acknowledged but the theme of 
accountability clearly dominated: expand access to higher education; ensure accountability in 
the use and effectiveness of federal funds; promote quality educational opportunities;  address 
the rising costs of higher education; simplify student aid and institutional aid programs; and 
promote student academic preparation for postsecondary education (Workforce, 2002). 
  Supported by President Bush, DOE’s HEA issue list was longer, but similarly stressed 
efficiency, results, and accountability and looked for ways to improve performance given the 
“significant levels of funding for HEA programs” (Office of Postseconday Education, 2002).  The 
higher education community, on the other hand, was relatively satisfied with HEA and 
proposed to focus on traditional access and affordability issues by increasing Pell grants, making 
loans cheaper and easier to get and to collect, simplifying the application process, improving 
pre-college information and preparation, and assuring program integrity and quality (40 Higher 
Education Associations, 2003; American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2003; 
Wolanin, 2003).  A few “sideshow” issues (as they were called by one participant) sponsored by 
individual members of Congress or well-connected interest groups—fire safety, emergency 
notification, file-sharing, loan forgiveness—got a hearing and in some cases action, but many 
were modified in the end by the active intervention of a unified higher education community. 
Accountability dominates.  The subjects of House and Senate education committee 
hearings on HEA make clear that whether the subject was consolidated loan interest rates, Pell 
POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION   17 
 
grant eligibility, the impact of tax benefits, barriers to course credit transfers, questions about 
the degree of intellectual freedom on college campuses, the sufficiency of peer-based 
accreditation to assure quality, how to improve graduation rates, bias in international 
education, concerns about the adequacy of teacher preparation programs, improving outreach, 
or the fiscal integrity of minority-serving institutions—all sessions were transformed into 
discussions of how to make higher education more accountable.  Concerns about cost, for 
example, led to discussions about how to reduce time to graduation, which raised the issue of 
enrollment in multiple institutions and student stories about problems of transferring courses 
across institutions, which allegedly slowed graduation and increased costs.  The transfer issue 
also engaged for-profit institutions concerned about the reluctance of traditional higher 
education institutions to give their courses academic credit.  So a contentious debate ensued 
over whether or not institutional autonomy over transfers should give way to some form of 
national regulation, splitting the higher education community and ending in compromise in 
HEOA in which institutions were required to publish their “transfer-for-credit” policies but not 
told what those policies should be.  Similarly, the disparity in cost and funding sources across 
public and private institutions produced a fascinating series of hearings on the use of 
endowment income, prompting a bipartisan proposal requiring a percentage to be spent to 
reduce tuition (which most of the higher education community opposed) that ended in an 
HEOA provision for further study by the Comptroller General. 
The dominance of the accountability theme during HEA’08 is also demonstrated by the 
contentious and high profile debate over accreditation.  The significance of the accreditation 
debate is based on the requirement that a postsecondary institution must be accredited by a 
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federally recognized accrediting agency in order for its students to be eligible for federal 
financial support.  The current arrangement governing higher education accreditation was 
created in 1952 when the U.S. Commissioner of Education published a list of “nationally 
recognized accrediting agencies and associations” that he determined “to be reliable authority 
as to the quality of training offered by an educational institution” which would then be eligible 
to enroll veterans under the G.I. Bill (Brittingham, 2009, p. 21).  In the years since, the criteria 
for recognition and the authority of the federal government over institutions and programs that 
receive federal funds have increased, although always stopping short of programmatic control 
(Ewell, 2008).  Currently, DOE “recognizes” some 60 regional and programmatic accrediting 
bodies that in turn have accredited more than 7,000 accredited institutions and programs 
whose students are eligible to receive Title IV funding under HEA.  (See 
http://www.ope.ed.gov/accreditation).    
Questions about how well such a federally sanctioned self-regulation process serves the 
public good v. private self-interest have been debated in the U.S. since before the constitution 
(Brittingham, 2009; Harcleroad, 1980) and frequently resurfaced during HEA reauthorizations.  
DOE’s complaint that accrediting bodies serve member rather than the public interest 
generated efforts in HEA’92 and HEA’98, for example, to eliminate the accreditation 
requirement or to use rule-making to set performance standards as a condition of recognition 
(Ewell, 2008; Finkin, 2009; Pelesh, 1995).     
Although earlier efforts to set federal standards for accreditation failed in the face of 
united opposition from the higher education community and its congressional allies, 
accountability proponents renewed the battle with HEA’08.  In spring 2002, DOE’s Inspector 
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General indicated what was to come with a short-notice audit of the standards of the Higher 
Learning Commission (HLC), the largest of the regional accrediting agencies, looking for “hard, 
specific numbers” regarding student learning thresholds or program length (Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG), 2002, p. 21).  Its report to Congress that HLC was “not auditable” in 
the absence of such numerical standards set the stage for Rep. Buck McKeon (R-CA) and other 
reformers who made accreditation a key accountability issue at the beginning of HEA’08.  Their 
allegation was that accreditors imposed standards that were either vague or had “nothing or 
little to do with academic quality” (e.g., diversity) while ignoring poor performance in 
graduation rates in the face of rising costs.  McKeon’s solution was to give states the authority 
to accredit institutions using federally required performance standards, eliminating the current 
peer reviewed self-regulation system altogether.  As HEA’08 progressed, DOE Secretary 
Margaret Spellings used her own No Child Left Behind (NCLB) experience and the findings of the 
National Commission on the Future of Higher Education returned to the strategy of proposing 
tougher accreditation rules in 2007, this time to include standardized testing and minimum 
standards for student learning as a measure of institutional quality. 
Many Republicans and Democrats as well as a united higher education community 
considered the internationally recognized quality of American higher education synonymous 
with institutional autonomy.  They argued that standardized achievement standards could not 
reflect the admirable diversity in American higher education and vigorously resisted greater 
government interference via accreditation regulation, raising the specter of political control of 
the curriculum and the end of the American higher education’s international supremacy of 
(Council for Higher Education Accreditation, 2005).  The debate was waged in congressional 
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hearings, conferences, research reports, and position papers throughout the 2002–2008 
reauthorization process, including an aborted 2007 effort to involve stakeholders in negotiating 
new DOE rules (Lederman, 2007).  Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN), a former university 
president and DOE secretary himself, chastised Spellings and applauded HELP’s 2007 letter 
asking her not to pursue accreditation regulation, arguing that Congress should work with 
higher education to develop better assessment methods.  The Democratic House 
Appropriations Committee also included a prohibition against DOE accreditation regulation in 
its 2007 DOE budget bill.  While some higher education advocates quietly acknowledged that 
the Secretary probably did have the legal authority to set achievement standards via 
accreditation regulations, clearly the concept was not an idea whose political time had come. 
The final legislative result was an uneasy compromise.  HEOA provisions required that 
accrediting agencies include measures of student achievement in the assessment of 
institutional quality while recognizing that measures and standards will differ with institutional 
mission.  At the same time it denied the Secretary the authority to set such standards and 
changed the membership of the federal agency that approves accreditors from DOE to 
Congressional appointment.  The process of setting recognition criteria was delegated to the 
negotiated rule-making process under DOE’s supervision.  As Tom Wolanin (2003) had 
predicted, the changes were incremental but not insignificant and clearly moved the federal-
higher education policy balance toward the possibility of greater regulation. 
 
Political actors.  How environment conditions and issues demands are translated into 
policy outcomes depends heavily on the preferences of political actors whose political 
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resources—authority, constituency, ideas, and strategy—at the time of formal decision enable 
them to influence the final outcome.  Given the sheer complexity of the both the issues at hand 
and the structural fragmentation of the decision process in the American political process, 
policy researchers have found that each policy arena tends to be dominated by a broadly 
defined issue network composed of public and private individuals and organizations actively 
seeking to influence public policy in that particular domain (Heclo, 1978). Within a given policy 
arena, these actors can be aggregated into a number of “advocacy coalitions” defined by a set 
of shared beliefs about policy solutions that engage in “a nontrivial degree of coordinated 
activity” to advance shared goals.  Mature advocacy coalitions maintain consensus on core 
beliefs and policy positions although less so on secondary aspects of implementation over long 
periods of time (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, pp. 119-124).  Coalitions vary in their degree of 
influence over policy outcomes depending upon the context and the political resources of its 
members at any given time (Lowi, 1972). 
HEA issue networks.  Members of HEA-related policy subsystems include members of 
the education committees of Congress and their staffs, the president and the DOE, and an 
extensive network of higher education related associations, organizations, foundations, and 
individuals.  This latter group can be further divided into the higher education associations 
representing higher education institutions and those representing specific higher education 
constituents or issues (known collectively and colloquially as “The Community”3), those 
                                                     
3 See the Washington Higher Education Secretariat member list (Washington Higher Education 
Secretariat, 2009).  
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speaking for financial vendors and other provider groups, a growing number of private 
foundations commissioned to research higher education topics (many from a particular point of 
view), and an also growing number of reporters, academics, and higher education policy 
analysts.  Studies of the relative political resources of these higher education policy actors have 
found that executive influence depends upon the priorities of the president, that the power of 
the long-time HEA congressional core has declined due to retirements and partisan positioning, 
and that the special interest community has fragmented and varied in influence as HEA 
expanded in scope and impact (Cook, 1998; Hannah, 1996; Heclo, 1978; Parsons, 1997). 
During HEA’08, the role of the executive was on the rise.  From the beginning, President 
Bush set the agenda and never wavered from the cost and accountability position he advanced 
in the 2002 DOE strategic plan and reiterated in every subsequent budget message or policy 
statement.  Given his firm control over the Republican Congressional leadership (especially in 
the House) and Cabinet, any proposed legislation or regulations stayed on message.  The 
pressure only intensified when Spellings became Secretary of DOE in January 2005 and took a 
pro-active reform stance, creating the National Commission on the Future of Higher Education 
and convening a number of stakeholder conversations on issues of performance, transparency, 
and accountability.  
Party leaders, the chairs of the key House and Senate education and budget committees 
and their staffs were the critical Congressional actors in HEA’08.  Republican EWC chairs John 
Boehner (R-OH) and then Buck McKeon (R-CA) toed the party line and offered the most 
dramatic of the reform proposals.  When it was his turn, Democrat ELC chair George Miller (D- 
CA) was less partisan and more collaborative, allowing wider input and hewing closer to the old 
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HEA social equity values and bipartisan style.  Senate HELP chairs Republican Michael Enzi (R- 
NV)and Democrat Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who changed seats twice during reauthorization, 
also embodied HEA traditions and worked closely and of the same mind throughout HEA’08.  
Although a few old HEA hands were still in key staff roles, particularly on the Senate side, many  
congressional staff members were new, inexperienced with legislation as complex as HEA, and 
had little commitment to the past (Field, 2008).  Higher education lobbyists interviewed for this 
analysis lamented that “we had to teach them everything!” and were especially concerned that 
the young staffers did not value the diversity of American higher education.  
The expanding higher education network of groups seeking to influence the process also 
experienced change in membership and relative influence during HEA’08.  Technology 
empowered everyone, allowing Washington, D.C.-based staffs to do a more effective job of 
representing, informing, and rallying their constituencies, particularly, as EWC chair McKeon 
complained, in opposition to any change in the status quo.  The “unifying voice” of the 
“Brethren” —institution-member associations representing the five historically important 
higher education sectors and traditionally convened by the American Council on Education 
(ACE) 4—continued to fragment over specific issues, resulting in uneven access and impact on 
the process.  AASCU, for example, did not sign off on the HEA recommendations ACE sent to 
                                                     
4 National Association of State Colleges and Land Grant Universities (NASCLGU), American 
Association of Universities (AAU), American Association of State Colleges and Universities 
(AASCU), National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU), and the 
American Association of Community Colleges (AACC). 
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EWC in March 2003 on behalf of some 40 higher education associations.  Instead it joined with 
two student-focused organizations to support specific financial aid positions and consulted 
separately with Congressional leaders and staff in the negotiations on cost issues, getting credit 
in 2004 for convincing McKeon to drop the sanctions from his Cost Index plan.  When the 
higher education community did speak with one voice, as on the issue of accreditation, 
however, it was able to gain at least compromise on the reform proposals its members found 
most objectionable. 
The Career College Association (CCA), representing some 950 for-profit and career-
related postsecondary institutions, continued to go its own way and opted out of ACE in fall 
2002 as HEA’08 began, complaining of “being treated like second-class citizens” (Borrego, 2002, 
p. A28).  In Congress, Republicans liked CCA members because of the business model, and 
Democrats could not help but appreciate CCA’s access goals.  During HEA’08, the CCA’s fortunes 
initially declined due to Congressional worries over default rates and lender kick-backs and 
nearly unanimous opposition from the traditional higher education community on the transfer 
issue.  CAA later rebounded on the basis of the rapid enrollment growth in for-profit 
institutions and the development of student learning assessment methods that fit well with the 
prevailing accountability agenda.  While the transfer question was in the end left unresolved, 
CCA easily won its demand for relaxation of the 50% on-campus courses rule for aid eligibility 
early in the process and was an effective advocate for its members’ interests throughout. 
There were also rising and falling voices beyond the institutional association circle.  
Student-based aid organizations partnered with community members to become more visible.  
Traditionally influential financial aid and banking associations such as the National Association 
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of Financial Aid Administrators (NASFAA), the National Council of Higher Education Loan 
Providers (NCHELP) and the Consumer Bankers Association (CBA) lost influence after the 
“perfect storm” (as one participant called it) Cuomo investigations.  A growing chorus of “think 
tanks” and special interest foundation voices led to the well-publicized release of HEA-related 
research reports and testimony—several with a clear ideological bent—which got attention and 
affected priorities and proposals on specific provisions.  Reports from the Institute for College 
Access and Success (whose president was to become undersecretary of DOE for financial aid in 
the Barack Obama administration) on aid issues, the Education Trust on graduation rates, the 
College Board on aid and cost trends and options, the National Center for Public Policy and 
Higher Education on affordability, and the Institute for Higher Education on HEA, for example, 
were widely quoted in support of positions on all sides. 
Higher education advocacy coalitions.  Each HEA issue generated its own policy 
subsystem of actors from Congress, the executive, and special interest sectors.  The subsystem 
created around issues related to minority-serving institutions, for example, had a different cast 
than the subsystem concerned with international education or that surrounding the loan limit 
or loan consolidation.  Advocacy coalitions within each subsystem sought to advance their 
positions, holding firm on their core commitments and dividing on more secondary issues.  
AASCU’s defection from the “Brethren” on the issue of transfers or student loan limits but solid 
support on accreditation is illustrative.   
The dominating issue of accountability in HEA’08, however, created an overarching HEA-
policy subsystem composed of advocacy coalitions defined by their beliefs about the 
appropriate relationship between higher education and the federal government.  At their core, 
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coalitions either took the social equity position that government should play the role HEA’65 
intended by helping needy and middle-class students go to independently operated higher 
education institutions, or an individual freedom position in which government assures 
institutional quality in an otherwise open market.  The former, composed of long-time HEA 
supporting Congressmen and staffers on both sides of the aisle, Democratic leadership, and 
most of the traditional higher education institutional and program network, focused on access 
and aid to students and the principle of institutional autonomy.  The latter, represented by 
younger and mostly Republican members of Congress and staffers with less allegiance to the 
higher education establishment, budget-conscious Republican reformers and newer 
postsecondary institutions, argued that if institutions accept federal aid even indirectly through 
students, they should be held accountable through regulation.  The considerable vendor 
community was caught somewhat in the middle, profiting from federal aid programs, but also 
aligning with reformers on the side of the market.   
By the end of HEA’08 the cost issue had revealed fault lines cutting across both belief 
systems, forcing the social equity coalition to acknowledge claims for fiscal responsibility and 
the market coalition to recognize that the diversity of American higher education prevented a 
simplistic standards approach.  The traditionalists had experience, organization, public 
recognition of the importance of higher education, and eventually Congressional control and its 
Democratic leadership on their side.  The reformers had the presidency and his administration, 
Congressional control for three of the four Congresses involved, rising public questions about 
college costs and operations, and a willingness to challenge the status quo on theirs.  Eventually 
partisan-led delay and public pressure forced the traditional higher education advocacy 
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coalition in and out of Congress to accommodate to public demands for greater transparency 
and accept provisions for increased reporting of costs and operations in exchange for their 
priority goal of more student aid support.  As one observed noted, with the calls for 
accountability growing louder, the higher education community settled.  
Institutional dynamics.  Policy process scholars have produced extensive research to 
demonstrate that “regime rules”—that constellation of formal and informal policies and 
practices that structure the political decision making process—matter.  Eleanor Ostrom’s (1999) 
“Institutional Analysis and Development” theory is perhaps the most fully developed 
explanation of why, holding that the behavior of “rational” individuals (admittedly “bounded” 
by their limitations) must take institutional decision-rules into account as they pursue their own 
self-interest.  Such rules are in turn affected by history, the environment, the nature of the 
policies at issue, and the skills and commitments of the actors involved.  In the case of HEA ’08, 
the rules clearly mattered, especially given the heightened partisanship of the Congressional 
law-making process. 
Congressional law-making process: The “broken branch”?  A critique comparing the 
Democrat-controlled 110th Congress to the Republican-controlled 104th (coincidently covering 
the same time period as HEA’08) labeled Congress “the broken branch” for its inability to create 
majority coalitions sufficient, in the analysts eyes, to meet its Constitutional responsibilities for 
deliberative law-making, self-management, and balancing the other branches of government 
(Mann & Ornstein, 2006).  An increase in routine and symbolic versus substantive measures 
passed, a decline in oversight hearings, fewer mark-up sessions, an increase in the percentage 
of restrictive rules for debate in the House, more minority motions to recommit, more cloture 
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motions in the Senate, and higher party unity scores (especially among the majority party) were 
interpreted as indications of a more partisan, less open, and less productive Congressional 
lawmaking pattern than even a decade ago (Binder, Mann, Ornstein, & Reynolds, 2009).  These 
“patterns of dysfunctional behavior” were explained, at least partly, as “natural and 
understandable responses to powerful forces in the political and social environment” that had 
resulted in  a “strikingly” partisan era in American government dominated by two strong and 
ideologically polarized parties operating on narrow margins among elected officials and the 
electorate.  The resulting struggle for control of the government has, in the words of a recent 
Brookings report, led to “an unabashed manipulation of electoral and governing institutions to 
achieve political and policy goals” (Binder, Mann, Ornstein, & Reynolds, 2009, p. 3). 
The case of HEA’08.  Such manipulation was in full view during HEA’08.  Participants 
interviewed for this analysis believed that the “poisonous” partisan environment in Congress 
resulted in a very different law-making process for HEA’08 than for previous reauthorizations.  
They pointed to the long delays and multiple extensions, “hi-jacking” by budget reconciliation, 
confrontational hearings, bitter press exchanges, limited staff interaction, closed mark-up 
sessions, narrow vote majorities, limited debate rules in the House, significant manager and 
“log-rolling” amendments, and even a minority motion (rejected on a party-line vote) to 
recommit in the closing Senate floor debate as examples of the prevailing “unabashed” rule 
manipulation by both parties for partisan ends. 
Analyzing House and Senate floor votes over time, however, suggests a less dramatic 
and more nuanced impact of partisanship on HEA.  Figures 1 and 3 (House) and 2 and 4 (Senate) 
present the floor vote by party on the relevant committee HEA reauthorization and budget 
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reconciliation proposals from 1965–2008.  Several observations are relevant.  First, six of the 
nine reauthorization votes occurred in times of divided government when the White House and 
at least one Chamber were controlled by different political parties.  Despite the possibility of 
conflict, the tradition of strong bipartisan support for HEA goals has routinely resulted in 
extraordinary majorities on comprehensive or programmatic HEA reauthorizations.  The only 
exceptions—HEA’86 and HEA’08 in the House—were instances when a particular issue was 
unusually contentious.     
On the other hand, votes on means, as in budget reconciliation, rather than ends, as in 
the more comprehensive or programmatic reauthorizations, have more often been highly 
contentious and highly partisan, especially in 1993 and 2005 during times of unified 
government when the party in power forced its provisions through.  In 1993, for example, not 
one Republican in the House or in the Senate voted for Clinton’s expansion of direct lending. 
Party roles were reversed in the 2005 reconciliation votes when Republicans insisted on higher 
interest rates and lender subsidies to encourage conventional market-based approaches.   
Old debates were revived and new ones joined in an increasingly “poisonous partisan 
environment” as HEA’08 unfolded.  A unified Republican 109th Congress forced contentious 
HEA financial provisions into reconciliation to override minority opposition, earning party-line 
votes on public law 109-171 and inviting a similar strategy when the Democrats gained the 
majority in the 110th Congress and used reconciliation to redress the policy balance.   
Conclusion: From Access to Accountability 
Guided by John Kingdon’s policy streams model (Kingdon, 2003), Figure 1 describes 
HEA’08 as the convergence of a problems stream of complaints about rising costs and questions 
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about higher education performance; a policy stream of popular standards-based regulation 
and accountability; and a politics stream of heightened partisanship, reform-minded Republican 
control of Congress and a President uncommitted to traditional higher education, and 
fragmentation in the traditional higher education advocacy coalition.  Republican policy 
entrepreneurs exploited their majority position, the relative weakness of a higher education 
advocacy coalition in transition, and higher education’s “legitimacy paradox” in the eyes of the 
public to open a policy window and propose ambitious accountability-focused regulatory 
reforms.  Although reformers were stymied when their political support dwindled after the 
Democratic victories in 2006, the idea of greater accountability captured enough momentum to 
move the balance point in federal-higher education relations away from access and autonomy 
toward greater regulation and intervention.  
HEA’08 ended with the passage of the 1,158 page HEOA that August.    HEOA 
reauthorized HEA programs until 2014 and included 101 new HE reporting requirements, 
including textbook costs, “net cost” graduation rates by income category, transfer-of-credit 
policies, peer-to-peer file sharing policies, teacher licensure pass rates, emergencies, and lists of 
lenders.  Regulations regarding relationships between institutions and private student loans 
were tightened; for-profits were granted a two-year loan limit reprieve; and the ban on certain 
kinds of HE lobbying was reiterated.  DOE was prohibited from establishing a student record 
system or setting student achievement standards via accreditation but could require 
accrediting agencies do so.  Pell was authorized as a year-round program and limits were 
increased to $8,000 by 2014.  States were to be denied access to certain grants if they did not 
maintain the last five year’s average support (“maintenance of effort”) for higher education.  
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Some 70 new programs were authorized (many added at the last minute to gain votes), 
although few were expected ever to be funded.  HEOA also authorized six new studies on yet 
unresolved aid and higher education issues such as the amounts and uses of endowment funds, 
the impact of federal regulation on college cost, the possibility of racial bias in admissions tests, 
the mix of criteria for private loans, the burden of federal regulation of higher education, and 
the impact of cost and debt on student choice of programs of study and institutions.5    
The evolution of HEA into HEOA was both politically and theoretically predictable.  
HEA’s original redistributive goal to provide federal grants to help low-income students go to 
college had already become more distributive over time as participation and the desirability of 
a college education increased.  Increased demand prompted Congress to liberalize needs-based 
grant eligibility when political alignments permitted and to introduce loans and tax benefits for 
middle class students when broader support was needed.  As intended, the growth in grants 
and loans and expanded access by making higher education more affordable.  The result was 
growing enrollments, increasing federal expenditures, and, less accepted, ballooning tuition 
costs.  The combination of rising costs and demand generated questions about university 
operations and concerns about federal expenses.  Budget constraints paralleled heightened 
partisanship in Congress, leading to closer scrutiny of the size and purpose of HEA’s price tag.  
Democrats held to the ideals of HEA’s access heritage and institutional autonomy and 
Republicans called for greater oversight to rein in costs and strengthen institutional 
accountability.  Buffeted by generational shifts in leadership and fragmented by rapid structural 
                                                     
5 For a more detailed review of HEOA provisions, see ACE (2008). 
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changes in the delivery of higher education, traditional higher education actors and coalitions 
were able to forestall the most dramatic accountability measures and to shape specific 
implementation details and  but, in the end,  were forced to accommodate to new political 
realities.  The resulting policy shift in HEA’08’s from access toward accountability was, as 
participants commented at the time, was a “foregone conclusion” (Johnstone, 1998; Spencer, 
1999; Wolanin, 2003). 
How far toward a “national system of higher education” the evolving policy shift takes 
us, however, remains uncertain.  Robert Lowry’s comparative analysis of NCLB and HEOA 
concludes that the differences in public attitudes toward K–12 versus higher education quality; 
state monopoly versus institutionally competitive market structures; relatively hierarchical 
federal-state-local K–12 relationships versus complex federal-student-state-private institutional 
higher educational networks; and the greater effectiveness of higher education’s versus K–12’s 
organized interests in Washington make it “unlikely that there will be broad federal mandates 
in the foreseeable future” (Lowry, 2009, p. 522).    
Many of the “streams” that influenced HEA’08 are still in flowing in the same direction 
and the accountability/regulatory policy window is still open.  Public cost concerns have only 
heightened since HEAO was signed in August of 2008.  Pressure for greater institutional 
accountability has likewise increased with warnings about the threat of a growing federal 
deficit.  The higher education community remains divided about how to respond.  The political 
climate continues to be polarized along party lines.  And while the new Democratic 
administration elected only months after HEA’08 was completed supports traditional 
Democratic goals such as investment in higher education, it also intends to continue elements 
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of the Republican accountability agenda in response to public demand.  The new president’s 
commitment to direct-lending, for example, at once opened a “policy window” for a long-
sought Democratic policy preference and at the same time increased the pressure for federal 
regulatory intrusion in American higher education.  For the moment, the wider policy window 
that produced greater federal pressure for greater accountability in higher education is still 
wide open.  And unless there is a significant change either in public cost and efficacy concerns, 
or the policy momentum toward regulation, or dramatic shifts in political support, one can 
predict that, as predicted, the next HEA reauthorization will produce more of the same. 
  




 Figure 1.  House HEA Votes, by Party, 1965–2008.   Adapted from “U.S. House of Representatives 
Roll Call Votes”  (http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/index.htmll and  





Figure 2.  Senate HEA Votes, by Party, 1965–2008. Adapted from 
“U.S. Senate Roll Call Tables” 
(http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/a_three_sections_with_teasers/votes.htm) and  
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Figure 3.  House HEA Reconciliation Votes, by Party, 1993–2007.  Adapted from “U.S. House of 
Representatives Roll Call Votes”  (http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/index.htmll and  




Figure 4.  Senate HEA Reconciliation Votes, by Party, 1993–2007.  Adapted from 
“U.S. Senate Roll Call Tables” 
(http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/a_three_sections_with_teasers/votes.htm) and  
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Appendix A:   HEA’08 Congressional Digest 
The HEA reauthorization process usually begins in the fall two years before expiration.  The relevant House and 
Senate committees issue a call for public recommendations in late fall, hold hearings during the spring and 
summer, draft legislation and hold mark-up sessions over the fall and winter, move through committee, floor, and 
conference debates and final votes in the spring, and send an approved bill to the president by summer.  HEA’08 
began on schedule in fall 2002 two years before HEA’98’s scheduled 2004 expiration but eventually prompted 14 
extensions spread over six years and four Congresses.  The following timeline highlights major HEA actions and 
reactions by Congress and the higher education community.  HEA-related hearings are noted as illustrative of key 
issues and debates.  
107th Congress (2001-02):  President (R); House, (R) 221-214; Senate, (D) 51-49  
Second Session (2002) 
 February: DOE releases an HEA’98-required “Study of College Costs and Prices 1988/89 to 1997.”    
 March: President Bush announces a 5-year Strategic Plan for DOE including NCLB--inspired goal using 
graduation and retention rates and reduction in tuition increases to judge IHE’s institutional performance and 
increase accountability.  
 March-October: EWC and its C21st subcommittee hold hearings on financial aid access, HBCU’s performance, 
accreditation, rising college costs, and teacher education quality.  HELP, chaired by long-time HEA supporter 
Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MA) holds hearings on loan consolidation and web-based education quality.  
 September:  EWC’s chair John Boehner (R-OH) issues the traditional public call for HEA reauthorization 
recommendations.   
 November elections:  Republicans win a majority in the House and the Senate. 
 December: DOE proposes a grant program to tie retention and graduation rates to financial aid funding.   
 
108th Congress (2003-2004): President (R); House, (R) 229-206; Senate, (R) 51-49   
First Session (2003) 
 January:  Sen. Judd Gregg (R-VT) becomes HELP chair; Rep. Boehner (R-OH) remains House EWC chair. 
 January-March: The higher education community (one letter signed by 40 associations, headed by ACE) 
present largely incremental reauthorization proposals.   
 March:  Rep Buck McKeon (R-CA), C21st chair, proposes a “College Affordability Index” (CPI x 2); institutions 
exceeding the Index could lose aid eligibility.   
 May:  McKeon chairs hearing on “The State of American Higher Education: What are Parents, Students, and 
Taxpayers Getting for their Money?” and with EWC chair releases EWC’s HEA reauthorization goals: access, 
accountability, quality, costs, simplification, and college preparation. 
 Summer-fall: McKeon divides EWC’s HEA proposals into bills by title, holds hearings and oversees committee 
and House passage over objections of the Democratic minority and the higher education community.   EWC 
holds hearings on affordability, simplification, loan consolidation, college costs, accountability, and minority-
serving institutions.    
 October: The Senate holds hearing on intellectual diversity on in universities.  Sen. Kennedy introduces his 
largely incremental HEA proposal (S 1793).  
 Higher education associations, think tanks, and industry-related organizations submit reports, responses, and 
counter-proposals throughout the year, influenced by surveys showing continued high public support for 
higher education but also growing concerns about cost and accountability (Immerwahr, 2004).   
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Second Session (2004) 
 January: Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) makes HEA reauthorization a 2004 priority. 
 February: President Bush reiterates his HEA performance-based goals. 
 Winter: EWC staff invites several higher education associations to participate in drafting a new HEA bill (HR 
4283) consolidating bills introduced the previous session; Democrats complain of exclusion.    
 Winter: McKeon drops the penalties in his CAI proposal crediting AASCU, but warns against tuition increases.   
 March: HELP holds hearings on accreditation, higher education-workforce relations, and year-round academic 
calendars, but takes no further action.  
 May: The Education Trust releases “A Matter of Degrees” report on graduation rates. A coalition of higher 
education associations distributes a “toolkit” for lobbying against the EWC bill. McKeon and Boehner accuse 
the HE community of insensitivity to parents, students, and taxpayers.   
 June: McKeon announces that C21st will not vote on HEA because it had become “too partisan” since 
Democrats were making Republican proposals a campaign issue.   
 Fall: EWC and C21st hold hearings on proprietary institutions, accreditation, graduation rates, textbooks, and 
diploma mills. 
 November elections: Republicans retain control of the Presidency and both houses of Congress. 
109th Congress (2005-06): President (R); House, (R) 232-203; Senate, (R) 55-45 
First Session (2005) 
 January:  Senate unanimously supports Margaret Spellings as DOE Secretary.  Sen. Michael Enzi (R-WY) chairs 
HELP; House committee chairs do not change.   
 January: Several HE associations meet with DOE staff about a “unit record” system to track students on 
financial aid; idea eventually dropped due to aggressive opposition of private colleges.  
 February: President Bush’s FY06 Budget cuts HEA access programs and lender subsidies in order to expand Pell 
funding and loan eligibility, prompting HE opposition.   
 April: The FY06 Budget Resolution passes on party-line vote and includes a budget reconciliation process 
requiring EWC to find $13 billion in entitlement savings by mid-September.  HEA reauthorization now split 
(“high-jacked” according to one participant), with key grant and loan funding and operational provisions 
moved into the more restrictive budget reconciliation process while program authorization proceeded along 
the traditional legislative path.6   
 Spring-Summer: EWC subcommittees hold hearings on for-profit education, the impact of aid on cost, credit 
mobility, private vs. public aid, and the nursing shortage; HELP holds hearings on accountability and 
workforce-higher education relationships. 
 July: EWC passes HR 609 (a re-introduction of HR 4283 from the 108th Congress) that includes the budget 
reconciliation measures on a party-line vote. 
 September:  The Senate unanimously approves HELP’s HEA proposal (S 1614) co-sponsored by Enzi and 
Kennedy, attaching a less stringent budget reconciliation proposal by a 15-5 vote in October.   
                                                     
6 Created in 1974 as part of the congressional budget process, “reconciliation” begins when Congress issues 
directives to authorizing committees to make policy changes in mandatory spending (entitlements) or revenue 
programs (tax laws) to achieve spending and revenue goals established by budget resolution.  Intended as a 
spending constraint, reconciliation has become an important means for the majority party to force policy change 
because the resulting budget reconciliation bills are considered under special rules that limit amendment and 
prevent filibuster (www.rules.house.gov/archieves/bud_rec_proc.htm ). 
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 Fall: Intending to look past reauthorization, Secretary Spellings announces the formation of the NCFHE to 
recommend a national strategy for strengthening higher education by focusing on access, affordability, 
instructional quality, and accountability.   
 November:  House and Senate narrowly pass budget reconciliation bills that include HEA-related financial 
provisions.  Attempts to pass a combined HEA/reconciliation conference package (S 1932) in the Senate fail, 
with VP Cheney casting a tie-breaking vote that eliminated HEA-related program authorization provisions.  The 
Senate then approves a version without the program provisions, pushing a House vote to the next session.   
Second Session (2006) 
 February: House narrowly approves revised HEA-budget reconciliation conference report. President Bush signs 
the “Deficit Reduction Act of 2005” (PL 109-171) on February 8, 2006, enacting the first of the three HEA’08 
reauthorization bills.  Notable changes included elimination of the 50% eligibility limit on distance students or 
courses; an increase in loan limits and revision and reauthorization loan provisions for eight years; higher 
interest fees and interest rates for parents and students for five years; and new performance-based 
scholarships for students in selected fields.   
 February: McKeon becomes EWC chair when Boehner is elected Majority Leader. HELP holds hearings with 
Secretary Spellings on global competitiveness.  
 March: The House approves HR 609, minus the reconciliation provisions but with many amendments on a 
party-line vote.  
 Fall: EWC holds a field hearing on “Paying for College” and another on illegal piracy on campuses at the behest 
of the entertainment industry.   
 September: Secretary Spelling’s NCFHE report criticizes higher education performance; DOE proposes its 
regulatory recommendations through the accreditation process.  
 Fall: In reaction to the calls for greater accountability, AASCU and NASCLGU announce a new “Voluntary 
System of Accountability” (VSA) project. 
 November elections: Democrats win majorities in the House and Senate, shifting the balance of power and the 
emphasis for HEA a second time during reauthorization process. 
110th Congress (2007-08): President (R); House, (D) 223-202; Senate, (D) 51-49 
First Session (2007) 
 January: EWC (now ELC) and HELP chairs switch majority-minority roles.  The new Democratic leadership 
includes increasing Pell and reducing student loan interest rates in its “Six for‘06” agenda.   
 February: Secretary Spellings solicits “ambitious” ideas for changing financial aid post reauthorization.  The 
Democratic FY08 budget resolution continues the budget reconciliation process and proposes to reduce and 
redirect lender subsidies to Pell and other direct student aid.    
 March: President’s Bush’s FY’08 budget proposes similar reductions but for deficit reduction and smaller 
increases in Pell.   
 April: New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo settles an investigation of “kickbacks” from lenders to 
certain HE institutions, creating what one observer called a “perfect storm” weakening private lender 
influence and adding further support to the subsidy redirection strategy.   
 May: The House passes a separate “Student Loan Sunshine Act” to protect students and other borrowers 
receiving educational loans; Kennedy incorporates similar provisions into the Senate version of HEA.   
 May: Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-TN) announces opposition to DOE reform proposals on accreditation. 
 June: The House Appropriations Committee passes resolution prohibiting DOE from setting regulatory 
standards for the accreditation process; HELP also sends DOE a letter of opposition.   
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 Summer:  ELC holds hearings on access, college preparation, paying for college, campus safety, teacher 
preparation, and minority serving institutions.   
 June: HELP holds a bipartisan Executive Session on HEA and budget reconciliation. 
 July: House passes ELC’s FY08 budget reconciliation bill (HR 2669) after partisan debate on new mandatory 
programs, cuts in lender subsidies, and the targets for redirected funds.   
 July: Senate approves its reconciliation bill (S 1762) on a 78-18 vote and its HEA bill S 1642 (a re-introduction 
of S 1614) by a 95-0 vote with multiple amendments   
 September: The budget reconciliation conference report (HR 2669) passes both houses by large majorities.  
President Bush signs the budget reconciliation “College Cost Reduction and Access  Act of 2007” (CCRAA) after 
initially threatening a veto citing  Republican concerns about the size of cuts in lender subsidies, new 
programs, loan repayment options, loan forgiveness additions, and long-term cost.  CCRAA enacted a number 
of the key financial provisions of HEA, resulting savings of $20 billion in subsidies for private lenders used to 
relax eligibility and increase Pell with permanent funds for six years rather than the usual annual 
appropriation, cut interest rates in half for new subsidized loans, create income-based repayment options, 
expand teacher education and grant eligibility, institute loan forgiveness for certain public service work, and 
authorize a pilot program allowing for state auctions for PLUS loans.  
 October: House Republicans introduce their HEA-program version (similar in tone to HR 4283 in the 108th and 
HR 609 in the 109th Congresses).   
 November: ELC holds hearings on rising college costs and approves its HEA- bill (HR 4137) 45-0. 
 December: DOE’s Advisory Committee on Accreditation discusses possible accreditation regulations. 
Second Session (2008) 
 January:  Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT), chair, and Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA), ranking member, of the Senate 
Finance Committee, write to 136 institutions with endowments $500 million+ asking for spending information 
and consider requiring a 5% expenditure rate, sparking roundtables, hearings, and bipartisan pro and con 
testimony which extended past HEA’08.   
 February: After accepting HE community-engineered compromises on definitions of “cohort default rates” and 
state MOE requirements, House passes HR 4137 by 354-58. 
 March-April:  House and Senate conferees began work.  ELC and HELP continue to hold HEA-related hearings, 
ELC on HUBC’s, and the Senate on affordability.  Congressmen and HE representatives lobby the conference 
committee for preferred provisions.   
 May: Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) assumes Senate HEA leadership due to Sen. Kennedy’s illness.  Contention 
over new reporting regulations, state MOE requirements, and funding for HUBCs as “minority-serving” 
definitions changed slows process. ELC chair Miller prods Mikulski, concerned that HEA should pass by August 
or be delayed by presidential election politics.    
 June: AASCU, NASCLGU, and NAICU release templates for their members to use in reporting standard 
consumer information to enhance transparency for students and parents (VSA).   
 July: The process stalls again until Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK) agrees to lift his proposed hold as part of a larger 
protest on federal spending.  The House passes the conference report 380-49; the Senate,  83-8-1. 
 August: President Bush signs the “Higher Education Opportunity and Affordability Act of 2008 (HEOA)” (PL 
110-315) on August 14, 2008, completing the HEA’08 reauthorization process.  
HEOA is 1,158 pages long and reauthorizes HEA programs until 2014. It includes 101 new reporting items for 
institutions of higher education, including textbook costs, “net cost”, graduation rates by income category, 
transfer-of-credit policies, peer-to-peer file sharing policies, teacher licensure pass rates, and lists of lenders.  
Regulations regarding relationships between institutions and private student loans were tightened, for-profits 
were granted a two-year loan limit reprieve, the ban on certain kinds of higher education lobbying was reiterated, 
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and campuses were required to report emergencies as soon “as feasible.”  DOE was prohibited from establishing a 
student record system or setting student achievement standards via accreditation but could require that 
accrediting agencies do so. Pell was authorized as a year-round program and limits were increased to $8,000 by 
2014.  States were to be denied access to certain grants unless they sustained the last five year’s average 
(“maintenance of effort”) for higher education.  Some 70 new programs were authorized (many added at the last 
minute to gain votes), although few were expected ever to be funded.   HEOA also authorized six new studies on 
yet unresolved aid and higher education issues such as the amounts and uses of endowment funds, the impact of 
federal regulation on college cost, the possibility of racial bias in admissions tests, the mix of criteria for private 
loans, the burden of federal regulation of higher education, and the impact of cost and debt on student choice of 
programs of study and institutions.7    
Abbreviations: 
IHE: Institutions of higher education  
DOE: US Department of Education (federal office responsible for administering HEA) 
EWC: House Education and the Workforce Committee (responsible for HEA in House) 
C21st: EWC subcommittee on “21st Century Competitiveness” (oversaw HEA for EWC) 
HELP: Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (responsible for HEA in Senate) 
CAI: College Affordability Index 
AASCU:  American Association of State Colleges and Universities 
ACE: American Council on Education 
NAICU:  National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities 
NALGCU:  National Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities 
NCFHE: National Commission on the Future of Higher Education 
HBCU:  Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
HEOA:  “Higher Education Opportunity and Affordability Act of 2008”  
NCLB: “No Child Left Behind” – a reference to performance-based standards in K-12 education 
CCRAA: “College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007”  









                                                     
7 For a more detailed review of HEOA provisions see (ACE, 2008). 
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Sources 
Roll Call Votes: “U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Votes” 
 (http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/index.htmll; “U.S. Senate Roll Call Tables” 
(http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/a_three_sections_with_teasers/votes.htm ); and  
CQ Almanac Vote Tables (http://library.cqpress.com.ezproxy.lib.ipfw.edu/cqalmanac/ ). 
  
Legislative Histories: Lexis-Nexis Congressional (http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.ezproxy.lib.ipfw.edu/congcomp/form/cong/s_pubadvanced.html); THOMAS (http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
); and CQ Almanac (http://library.cqpress.com.ezproxy.lib.ipfw.edu/cqalmanac/ ).  
 
Oversight Hearings:  In Legislative Histories and GPO Access (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/chearings/ ).  
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